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Towards a Solution for Dilution: Likelihood
Instead of Actual Harm
SETH AARON ROSE*
The concept of trademark dilution has existed in many states since it was first
conceptualized in 1927. It was not until 1996, however, when Congress passed
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), that a claim for trademark dilution
was recognized on the federal level. In order to establish a trademark dilution
claim under the FTDA, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held that proof of
"actual, consummated harm" or "actual dilution of the value of the mark" is
required. The Second Circuit, on the other hand, requires only that the plaintiff
prove a "likelihood of dilution " of the mark's value.
This note attempts to demonstrate the inherent advantages of the likelihood
standard for trademark dilution. On a purely philosophical level, dilution is a
nebulous concept, and requiring proof of actual harm unnecessarily attempts to
confine an abstract concept with rigid parameters. On a practical level, the
difficulty of proving injury under the actual harm requirement directly conflicts
with the available remedies, for, after "going through the hoops" to prove
dilution, the injured plaintiff must be satisfied with merely an injunction against
the defendant's dilutive use of the mark Furthermore, since its inception in the
states, trademark dilution has maintained the likelihood standard. Finally, in
Congress' most recent "statement" on the issue, the purpose of the Trademark
Amendments Act of 1999 (TAA) implies support for the likelihood standard.
Moreover, the legislative history behind the TAA explicitly demonstrates disfavor
with the actual harm standard. The author believes these arguments are strong
support for federal courts to adopt the likelihood standard instead of the actual
harm standard for trademark dilution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consumers will likely never see DuPont shoes, Buick aspirin, or Kodak
pianos sold in commerce.' The reason why rests in the theory of trademark
dilution, a concept that until January 16, 1996, was not a federally provided-for
cause of action.2 Trademark dilution is defined as "the impairment of a
* B.A., The University of Virginia, 1999; J.D., The Ohio State University Michael E.
Moritz College of Law, 2002 (expected). I would like to thank my parents, Michael and Milly
Rose, for their continuing love and support and for providing me with both the desire and the
opportunities to achieve success. I would also like to thank my sister, Jodi Rose, for always
being herself. This note is dedicated to my wonderful family.
'See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. H14,317-01 (Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead). It
must be noted though, that if these companies did in fact create those products, they certainly
would be allowed to call them by their trademark names.
2Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. V 1998) [hereinafter
FTDA]. The Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) was amended in 1995 to include a
provision providing for a cause of action based on dilution of a famous trademark. Lanham Act,
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trademark's strength or effectiveness caused by the use of the mark on an
unrelated product, usually blurring the trademark's distinctive character or
tarnishing it with an unsavory association." 3
There currently is a split amongst several federal circuits in regard to the
proof needed to establish a federal claim of trademark dilution. The Fourth and
Fifth Circuits require proof of "actual, consummated harm" or actual dilution of
the value of a mark,4 while the Second Circuit holds that the plaintiff need only
prove a "likelihood" of dilution of the mark's value.5 This note attempts to show
that the Fourth and Fifth Circuits' interpretation of the requirements of proving
dilution under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) are impractical and
untenable given the history and theories behind the dilution doctrine. Part HI
explores the historical and legislative perspective of trademark dilution law. Part
III examines the Fourth and Fifth Circuits' rulings requiring "actual,
consummated harm," and Part IV reviews the Second Circuit's holding that only
a "likelihood of dilution" is needed to succeed on a trademark dilution claim
under the FTDA. Part V poses several arguments based on practical
considerations, the tradition of the dilution doctrine in the states, and the
legislative history behind the Trademark Amendments Act of 1999 (TAA) to
point out the advantages of the likelihood of dilution requirement. Finally, Part VI
concludes by suggesting that the need for an explicit amendment to clarify the
FTDA to require likelihood of dilution as the standard of proof in a federal
trademark dilution claim may have been obviated (at least temporarily) given the
current landscape of the dilution doctrine as portrayed in this note.
II. HISTORICAL AND LEGISLATIVE PERSPECTIVE
This Part discusses the background of the dilution doctrine by comparing it to
trademark infringement, tracing its development through state law, and
distinguishing state anti-dilution statutes from the FTDA.
Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127
(1994)).3 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 469 (7th ed. 1999); see, e.g., Eric A. Prager, The Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Substantial Likelihood of Confitsion, 7 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 121 (1996) (explaining the damage caused by dilution as harm to the
mark's uniqueness, its singularity, and its capacity to identify the source of goods sold under it).
4 Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000); Ringling
Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th
Cir. 1999).5Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Eli Lilly and Co.
v. Natural Answers, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 834, 852 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (agreeing with the Second
Circuit's interpretation of the FTDA as requiring a finding of a likelihood of dilution rather than
actual dilution); cf Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999) (approving
a cause of action under the FTDA based either on actual dilution or likelihood of dilution).
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A. Dilution vs. Infringement
The traditional route to legal protection of trademarks on the federal level had
been limited to trademark infiingement--a cause of action that is successful when
there is a likelihood that consumers will be confused as to the source, affiliation,
or sponsorship of goods or services.6 A finding of a likelihood of confusion,
however, is irrelevant in an action for trademark dilution as recognized by the
FTDA.7 Instead, a dilution action rests upon the idea that "even a nonconfusing
unauthorized use of a mark may cause an actionable harm to the mark's owner by
gradually whittling away the mark's distinctiveness and ability to identify the
source of goods or services.' 8 Dilution, in fact, is defined in section 45 of the
Lanham Act as the "lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
6 See Lori Krafte-Jacobs, Judicial Interpretation of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 659 (1998) (citing J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETrTON 23:1-124 (4th ed. 1996)). "The likelihood of
confusion standard has been the basic test for common-law as well as for federal statutory
infringement." MCCARTHY, supra, at 23:1. The Lanham Act provides for a federal claim for
trademark infringement. See Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1998).
A federal claim under the Lanham Act is prompted by a use in commerce of another's mark
that is "likely to cause confusion ... as to affiliation, connection, or association of such person
with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services,
or commercial activities ... ." Id.7See Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 6, at 659; see also Robert D. Litowitz & Douglas A.
Rettew, Cleansing and Clarifying the Mark. The Year-Old Federal Trademark Dilution Act is
Already Protecting Famous Marks from Blurring and Tarnishment, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 9,
1996, at 36. But see Charles E. McKenney & George F. Long, IMI, The Attainment of Fame and
the Aegis of Protection: The Courts and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, INTELL. PROP.
TODAY, Nov. 1998, at 42 (discussing the inconsistencies among state laws on dilution and how
judges interpret the existence of actual confusion or the likelihood of confusion). The authors
also noted that:
"While many courts were to finally embrace the notion that the existence of actual
confusion or the likelihood of confusion was not a condition precedent to an award of
relief based upon a dilution claim, most courts insisted that such proof was a necessary
element or condition for injunctive relief to be granted...
Id. 8 Krafte-Jacobs, supra note 6, at 659; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETMON § 25 crnt. c (1995) (the anti-dilution statutes rest on a judgment that the
"stimulant effect" of a distinctive and well-known mark is a "powerful selling tool" that
deserves legal protection); Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40
HARV. L. REV. 813, 825 (1927). Schechter's article has been widely cited as the foundational
piece of literature that led to the creation of anti-dilution law in the United States. See, e.g., Jerre
B. Swann, Sr., Dilution Redefined for the Year 2000, 37 Hous. L. REV. 729 (2000). Others
have referred to the damage caused by dilution of a trademark as the erosion of the "selling
power" of a famous mark. E.g., Kelley Drye & William R. Golden, Jr., A Proposed Framework
for Analyzing Federal Trademark Dilution Claims, THE METROPOLrrAN CORP. COUNs., Jan.
1997, at 8.
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distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of
[competition] or [likelihood of confusion]." 9
Dilution usually takes the form of blurring or tarnishment. Dilution by
blurring, the classic or "traditional" dilution theory, occurs when current or
prospective customers see the plaintiffs mark used in connection with other
goods and services. Although it may not cause confusion as to the source of the
product because the products may be sold in radically different markets, this non-
infringing use nonetheless dilutes or weakens the unique and distinctive
significance of the trademark holder's mark to identify and distinguish its
products or services. 10 Dilution by tamishment, on the other hand, is based on the
idea that a defendant's unauthorized use of plaintiffs mark will tarnish or degrade
the mark.1' One other theory of trademark dilution, recently propounded by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, is based on the idea that alterations
of a famous mark that have the potential to lessen the mark's selling power
constitute dilution. 2
915 U.S.C. § 1127 (Supp. V 1998). The FTDA provides eight non-exclusive factors to
help courts determine whether a mark is famous. See infra note 25.
'0 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at 24:68. An example cited by McCarthy is the use of the
name TIFFANY for a Boston restaurant. It is not likely to cause confusion with TIFFANY
jewelers, but the dilution doctrine still may provide TIFFANY jewelers with a right to prevent
the restaurant from using the name based on the theory that the TIFFANY mark will no longer
serve as a unique identifier of a certain jewelry store. "The unique and distinctive link between
the word TIFFANY and a certain fashionable jewelry store has been weakened." Id.; see e.g.,
Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1964). More hypothetical
examples of dilution by blurring are Buick aspirin, Schlitz varnish, Kodak pianos, and Bulova
gowns. MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at 24:68.1 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at 24:69. An example of dilution by tarnishment would be if
defendant used the mark without permission in an attempted parody context that is totally
dissonant with the image projected by the mark. Id. A famous case of dilution by tamishment is
known as the ENJOY COCAINE case. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp.
1183, 1190-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The court granted a preliminary injunction based on dilution,
emphasizing the damage to Coca-Cola Co.'s reputation caused by an unwholesome association
with an illegal drug. Id. at 1190-91. "[P]laintiff's good will and business reputation are likely to
suffer in the eyes of those who, believing it responsible for defendant's poster, will refuse to
deal with a company which could seek commercial advantage by treating a dangerous drug in
such jocular fashion." Id. at 1191.
"See Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1994). This case
involved the issue of whether an advertiser may depict an altered form of a competitor's
trademark to identify the competitor's product in a comparative advertisement. Id. at 40.
Specifically, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether
achieving a humorous effect in comparative advertising can constitute trademark dilution. Id. at
41. In affirming the District Court's preliminary injunction, the Second Circuit held that the
dilution found in this case did not fit within the traditional blurring or tamishment categories,
but rather represented a situation where the selling power of the mark could be diluted. Id. at
44-45. In attempting to distinguish lawful purposes of expression from what happened here, the
Second Circuit stated that:
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B. Historical Development of Dilution Protection
Dilution was recognized as a cause of action in many states,13 but was not
present on the federal level until 1996 when the FTDA was signed into law.14
Prior to the enactment of the FMDA, there was much inconsistency in the
patchwork system of dilution protection among the various states that had anti-
dilution laws.' 5 First, as of 1995 only twenty-six states had dilution laws.' 6 In
addition, the various state courts differed in their interpretations of their statute's
requirements in order to succeed on a dilution claim.'7 The usual requirement was
that the plaintiff merely demonstrate that its trademark was distinctive-that it
served to identify the plaintiff as the source of the good or service-and that
defendant's mark was likely to dilute plaintiffs mark.'8 The focus, therefore,
among the states that actually had anti-dilution laws was on a likelihood of
dilution, not on a showing of actual dilution.' 9 The "likelihood" focus was due in
large part to the words of the Model State Trademark Act itself: "Likelihood of
injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a
mark... shall be a ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of
"Sellers of commercial products who wish to attract attention to their commercials or
products and thereby increase sales by poking fun at widely recognized marks of
noncompeting products risk diluting the selling power of the mark that is made fun of.
When this occurs, not for worthy purposes of expression, but simply to sell products, that
purpose can easily be achieved in other ways."
Id. (internal citations omitted). Incidentally, this dilution claim was brought under New York's
anti-dilution statute, which applies the "likelihood of dilution" standard. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 368-d (McKinney 1984).
13See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at 24:80 (noting the fact that "twenty-six states had anti-
dilution statutes on the books" by the time that Congress passed the FTDA); see also infra notes
16, 76.
14See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at 24:84. "Nothing less than likelihood of confusion
would suffice to obtain trademark protection under the [Lanham] Act. Accordingly, dilution
alone did not constitute infringement under federal law of a federally registered or unregistered
mark." Id.
15 See Prepared Statement of Mary Ann Alford, Executive Vice President, International
Trademark Association, Before the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property (July 19, 1995), in FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, LEXIS, Nexis,
FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE File; see also 141 CONG. REC. H14,317-01 (Dec. 12, 1995).
16 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at 24:80; see, e.g., Litowitz & Rettew, supra note 7, at 36.
" Some state courts required a showing of likelihood of confusion to prevail in a dilution
cause of action, while others required that the parties not be competitors. Litowitz & Rettew,
supra note 7, at 36.
8 Ethan Horwitz & Eric A. Prager, What is Dilution and How is it Proved?: Complexities
of Question Dicussed, Some Useful Answers Provided, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2, 1996, at S7.
'
91Id
"
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competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of
goods or services."0
C. Distinguishing the Federal Trademark Dilution Act from State Dilution
Statutes
The legislative history surrounding the passage of the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995 indicates that the need for a law, national in scope, was
apparent. Many state courts were reluctant to grant nationwide injunctions for
violations of state law where almost half of the states had no dilution law.2' Thus,
based in large part on the urging of the International Trademark Association
(formerly known as the U.S. Trademark Association),22 the FITDA was passed
and became effective January 16, 1996.23
Despite the apparent consistency that the Federal Act attempted to bring to
the landscape of trademark dilution protection, a few minute, yet quite important,
details within the act itself have led to a split among the circuits and to uncertainty
for trademark owners. The FTDA is different from traditional state dilution
statutes in two major ways: first, the FTDA protects against dilution only in the
case of "famous" marks, and second, the "likelihood" language so apparent in
state statutes is not present in the FTDA.24 The requirement that a mark must be
famous in order to qualify for protection under the FTDA is logically a federal-
level requirement, given that most famous marks are at least national in scope.2"
20MODEL ST. TRADEMARK AcT § 12 (1964) (emphasis added).
21141 CONG. REc. H14,317-01 (Dec. 12, 1995); see also 141 CONG. REC. S19,306-10
(Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Proponents of the FTDA were concerned that
protection had depended on whether the forum where the suit was filed had a dilution statute,
which led to forum-shopping and increased litigation. Id.
22 See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at 24:87.
2 Federal Trademark Dilution Act, Pub. L. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996).
24See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. V 1998).25 The FTDA added section 43(c) to the Lanham Act and within section 43(c) there is a list
of factors that courts might employ in determining which marks are to be considered famous for
purposes of dilution protection. The eight factors are nonexclusive and nonbinding, and are as
follows:
(a) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark, (b) the duration and
extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with which the mark is
used; (c) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (d) the
geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (e) the channels of trade
for the goods or services with which the mark is used; () the degree of recognition of the
mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person
against whom the injunction is sought; (g) the nature and extent of use of the same or
similar marks by third parties; and (h) whether the mark was registered under the Act of
March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (Supp. V 1998). But c.f. Prager, supra note 3, at 130 (criticizing the
eight factors in the FTDA as "little more than a compilation of factors that courts have
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The departure from the "likelihood" language in terms of proof of dilution,
though, has proven to be the most controversial distinguishing feature between
the FTDA and the state dilution statutes.
IT[. THE ACTUAL HARM REQUIREMENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
There are two foundational cases-one from the Fourth Circuit 26 and one
from the Fifth Circuit27-- that have held that plaintiffs must prove an actual,
present injury in order to succeed on a dilution claim under the FTDA.
A. Ringling Bros. -Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Division of Travel Development
In Ringling Bros.,28 plaintiffs filed a claim under the FTDA alleging that
Ringling's famous circus trademark slogan, "The Greatest Show on Earth," had
been diluted by the state of Utah's commercial use of its trademark slogan, 'The
Greatest Snow on Earth."29 Ringling, since its inception in 1872, has used its
mark-for which it received federal trademark registration in 1961--to advertise
circus performances throughout the United States, exposing its mark to over
seventy million people each year in connection with the circus.30 Defendant Utah
Division of Travel Development (Utah) began using its "Greatest Snow" mark in
connection with Utah tourism services almost every year since 1962.31 Utah
registered its mark with the State of Utah in 1975, and it was granted federal
registration on January 21, 1997, despite Ringling's opposition.32
The basis for Ringling's appeal from the District Court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Utah was its contention that a famous mark is diluted
whenever a junior mark is sufficiently similar that consumers viewing them
"instinctively make a mental association" of the two.3 In addition, Ringling
argued that the court erred in interpreting the FTDA to require proof of "actual
traditionally used to assess the strength of a mark for purposes of trademark infringement
analysis") (emphasis added).
Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).27 Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
28170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).29Seeid at 451.30Id. Therefore Ringling's mark is famous and qualifies for dilution protection under the
FTDA. See supra note 25 (listing the eight non-exclusive factors that courts are encouraged to
use to determine fame).31Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 451.3 1d. at 451-52.331 Id. at 453.
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dilution. 34 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held, though, that dilution
under the FTDA consists of: "A sufficient similarity of marks to evoke in
consumers a mental association of the two that causes actual harm to the senior
marks' economic value as a product-identifying and advertising agent." 5
The court conceded that such an interpretation was a "stringent" view of
dilution, but they supported such a stance by looking at provisions that they found
to "expressly differentiate the FTDA on key points from the state statutes" and
assumed that Congress intended these differences.36
B. Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc.
. In Westchester Media,3 7 the Fifth Circuit was presented with a case involving
a conflict between the Lanham Act and the First Amendment.3" PRL USA
341d. The Fourth Circuit arguably erred in its reliance on three contextual factors: the
extent of the junior mark's exposure, the similarity of the marks, and the firmness of the senior
mark's hold. See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, A Circus Among the Circuits: Would the Truly
Famous and Diluted Performer Please Stand Up? The Federal Trademark Dilution Act and Its
Challenges, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. 158, 167 (2000). Nguyen criticizes the use of "the extent of the
junior mark's exposure" because such a factor is "not relevant in cases where the junior mark
triggers no recollection or thought of the famous mark." Id. The "similarity of the marks"
additionally is "not helpful because dilution can occur in cases such as parody or tamishment
where the junior mark may not be very similar to the famous mark." Id. Finally, the "firmness
of the senior mark's hold" is seen by Nguyen as a "redundancy of the 'fame' analysis because
the FTDA only protects marks that are famous." 1d. at 168. A dilution analysis is "not necessary
if the fame analysis reveals that the mark is not famous within the meaning of the FTDA
(internal citations omitted)." Id. Such use of apparently irrelevant factors in determining dilution
lends further credence to the fact that the Fourth Circuit erroneously interpreted and applied the
FTDA.
" See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458 (emphasis added). In so holding, the Fourth Circuit
stressed an "apparent recognition that broad interpretation of the statutes would undermine the
balance between private and public rights reflected in the traditional limits of trademark
protection," and that "the courts have continued to confine the cause of action for dilution to
cases in which the protectable interest is clear and the threat of interference is substantial." Id. at
455; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. b (1995).
16See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458-59, 461. The two key provisions of the FTDA that
the Fourth Circuit cites as distinct from state statutes are: (1) the notion that the FTDA
"proscribes and provides remedy only for actual, consummated dilution and not the mere
'likelihood of dilution' proscribed by the state statutes," and (2) the specific definition of
dilution as the "lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods and
services," where the "end harm at which it is aimed is a mark's selling power, not its
'distinctiveness' as such." Id. at 458. This author argues, though, that such a disparate view
from state precedent is actually an unintended result of the careless drafting of Congress,
specifically in regard to the actual harm versus likelihood of dilution causation requirement. See
infra Part V.B.
" 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
3 See 'POLO' Magazine Title Is Infringing: FTDA Requires Proof of Actual Harm, 60
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 1482, at 208 (July 14, 2000). The First Amendment
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Holdings, Inc. (PRL) is a fashion and design business founded in 1967 by Ralph
Lauren that, between 1996 and 2000, had sold approximately four billion dollars
worth of products bearing various "Polo" trademarks.39 Westchester Media
publishes magazines, and in May 1997 they purchased the assets, including the
trademarks, of POLO Magazine-a magazine about the equestrian sport of
polo.40 After several debates with PRL over advertising in the magazine,
Westchester Media sought a declaration that its use of the title POLO for its
magazine on "equestrian sports and lifestyles" does not infringe PRL's "Polo"
mark.4' PRL sought injunctive relief by asserting counterclaims for trademark
infringement, dilution, and unfair competition under the Lanham Act and Texas
state law.
42
After a magistrate judge found that Westchester had violated the Lanham Act
by infringing PRL's "Polo" trademark, Westchester appealed and challenged the
magistrate judge's analysis of PRL's counterclaim under the FTDA.43 Citing
Ringling Bros., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
the FTDA requires proof of actual harm.44
tension arose here because PRL was trying to prevent Westchester from using "Polo" as a title
for a magazine, which implicated the First Amendment right to choose an appropriate title for
literary works. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 664 (citing Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan,
177 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999)).
39See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 661.
40Id. The founder of POLO Magazine, Ami Shinitzky, is a polo enthusiast and United
States Polo Association member. Id. After frequent questions regarding a possible connection
between POLO Magazine and PRL, Shinitzky obtained federal registration for POLO covering
a "magazine on the subject of equestrian sports and lifestyles." Id. at 662. After POLO
Magazine was bought by Westchester Media in May 1997, the new magazine was launched in
October 1997. Id. The magazine was "not about the sport, but rather about an adventurous
approach to living life." Id.
41See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 663.42id.
41Id. The magistrate judge had "first entered a preliminary injunction and required
Westchester to disseminate a disclaimer which states clearly that POLO Magazine has no
affiliation, sponsorship, or association with Ralph Lauren, or any Polo Ralph Lauren entities"
prominently on the cover, masthead, and on the table of contents page. Id. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the permanent injunction and reinstituted the disclaimer
procedure pending the appeal. Id.
"See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 670. As support for its holding, the Fifth Circuit
relied on the plain meaning of the statute. Id. It also found importance in the fact that the federal
statute did not incorporate the "likelihood of dilution" standard found in many state dilution
statutes. Id. The court said "[b]oth the present tense of the verb ['causes dilution' as found in the
FTDA] and the lack of any modification of 'dilution' support an actual harm standard." Id. at
671.
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V. LIKELIHOOD OF DILUTION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
In its Nabisco holding, the Second Circuit interpreted the FTDA to require
plaintiffs to merely show a "likelihood of dilution" for federal trademark dilution
claims.
A. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.
The Second Circuit, in Nabisco, Inc., v. PF Brands, Inc. ,45 explicitly
disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the FTDA, instead holding
that the FTDA required only a "likelihood of dilution."'46 In Nabisco, PF Brands,
Inc. (Pepperidge Farm) brought a preliminary injunction to prevent Nabisco from
distributing an orange, bite-sized, cheddar cheese-flavored, goldfish-shaped
cracker that closely resembled Pepperidge Farm's trademark Goldfish cracker.47
Pepperidge Farm had been producing the Goldfish cracker continuously since
1962 and had obtained numerous trademark registrations for the Goldfish design
and name.48 In the spring of 1998, Nabisco was approached by Nickelodeon
Television Network to explore a possible joint promotion for Nickelodeon's new
cartoon program, "CatDog." 49 A few months later, as a result of the character
lineup on this Nickelodeon television show and because of the "Joint Promotion
Agreement" between Nickelodeon and Nabisco, Nabisco ended up producing
packages of small orange crackers in three shapes, one of which happened to be a
fish.50 The fish-shaped cracker closely resembled Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish
cracker in color, shape, size, and taste, although the "CatDog fish" was somewhat
larger and flatter with markings on one side.'
45 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).46Id. at 223-24.
47Id. at 212. The allegation was that Nabisco's cracker would dilute the distinctive quality
of Peperidge Farm's mark in violation of the FTDA. Id.
Id. In addition, "[f]rom 1995 to 1998, net sales of Goldfish crackers more than doubled,
to $200 million per year. Measured by sales volume, Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish is the second-
largest selling cheese snack cracker in America today. Measured in sales dollars, Goldfish ranks
number one." Id. at 213.49Id. CatDog became one of the most widely watched children's television shows in its
first three months. Its characters featured a mouse, a rabbit, a squirrel, and several dogs. Id.
50 Id. Half of the shapes in each package were in the shape of the two-headed CatDog
character, one-quarter were in the shape of a bone, and one-quarter were in the shape of a fish.
Id.
51 Id. This case was essentially a trade dress case. At common law, product and package
configurations, to be protected against unfair competition by simulation, have to meet three
basic criteria: (1) non-functionality; (2) proof of secondary meaning; and (3) likelihood of
confusion. See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at 7:53. Because qualifying trade dress is registerable
as a "trademark" or a "service mark," it is a candidate for protection under Lanham Act section
43(c). Id. at 24:90.
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After Nabisco sought a declaratory judgment of non-violation of Pepperidge
Farm's rights in the Goldfish, Pepperidge Farm counterclaimed that Nabisco's
goldfish constituted, inter alia, trademark dilution under the FTDA and moved
for a preliminary injunction to bar Nabisco from marketing its product.52 The
district court found for Pepperidge Farm and granted the preliminary injunction."
This ruling was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.54 The Second Circuit, in construing the FTDA, laid out the five necessary
elements to prove a claim of dilution, yet the basis of their ruling turned almost
entirely on their interpretation of the fifth element, "dilution of the distinctive
quality of the mark.""5
The Second Circuit's discussion of Nabisco's fourth contention on appeal-
that dilution cannot be found without documentation of actual injury, consisting
of an actual reduction in the senior mark's selling power 56-is especially
instructive. In expressing its disagreement with the Fourth Circuit's interpretation
of the FTDA, the Second Circuit differentiated between a narrow and broad
position, one of which the Fourth Circuit may have intended to adopt." The
narrow position would be that courts may not infer dilution from "contextual
factors (i.e. degree of mark and product similarity)," but must instead rely on
evidence of "actual loss of revenues" or the "skillfully constructed consumer
survey" to prove actual dilution.58
The Second Circuit stated that "requiring proof of actual loss of revenue
seems inappropriate" 59 and reasoned that "contextual factors" have long been
used to establish infringement and likewise should be employed to show
52Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 213.
53Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., and Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 212
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
"4191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999).
55Id. at 215-22. The court understood the FTDA to establish five elements for a dilution
claim: (1) the senior mark must be famous; (2) it must be distinctive; (3) the junior use must be
a commercial use in commerce; (4) it must begin after the senior mark has become famous; and(5) it must cause dilution of the distinctive quality of the senior mark. Id. at 215. The court
focused on element two and element five, and after a brief discussion of the parameters of the
distinctiveness requirement, found that the Pepperidge Farm Goldfish mark was reasonably
distinctive enough to qualify for the FTDA's protection. Id. at 216. The court took much longer
to discuss element five (whether there was dilution of the distinctive quality of the senior mark),
considering ten nonexclusive factors in helping them to determine that Pepperidge Farm was
likely to succeed in establishing that Nabisco's use of its goldfish-shaped cracker would dilute
the distinctive quality of Pepperidge Farm's famous mark. Id. at 217-22.561d. at 223-25.
57Id. The court conceded that it was "not clear which of two positions the Fourth Circuit
adopted by its requirement of proof of 'actual dilution."' Id. at 223.
58Id. at 223 (citing Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449,457,464-65 (4th Cir. 1999)).
59Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223-24.
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dilution.6° In support of this position, the court mentioned the practical difficulties
inherent in requiring proof of actual harm.61 According to the Second Circuit, the
broader position that the Fourth Circuit may have intended to adopt with their
holding in Ringling Bros. (of the need to prove actual harm) "would require not
only that dilution be proved by a showing of lost revenues or surveys but also that
the junior [user] be already established in the marketplace before the senior [user]
could seek an injunction. 6 2 Despite recognizing the textual support to this
reading,63 the Second Circuit opined that Congress meant to provide for an
injunction to prevent dilution before it occurs.64 Thus, given the inequities and
difficulties inherent in the actual harm standard, the Second Circuit held that a
plaintiff need only prove a likelihood of dilution to succeed under the FTDA.65
V. LIKELIHOOD OF DILUTION: A BETrER STANDARD THAN ACTUAL HARM
J. Thomas McCarthy, one of the leading commentators on trademarks and
unfair competition, has stated that the argument over these standards can be
resolved by examining the definition of dilution. He says, and this author agrees,
60 Id. at 224.61 Id. at 223-24. The Second Circuit emphatically stated the following:
"If the famous senior mark were being exploited with continually growing success, the
senior user might never be able to show diminished revenues, no matter how obvious it
was that the junior use diluted the distinctiveness of the senior. Even if diminished revenue
could be shown, it would be extraordinarily speculative and difficult to prove that the loss
was due to the dilution of the mark. And as to consumer surveys, they are expensive, time-
consuming and not immune to manipulation. Ifajunior user began to market Buick aspirin
or Schlitz shellac, we see no reason why the senior users could not rely on persuasive
circumstantial evidence of dilution of the distinctiveness of their marks without being
obligated to show lost revenue or engage in an expensive battle of surveys. Plaintiffs are
ordinarily free to make their case through circumstantial evidence that will justify an
ultimate inference of injury."
Id.
62 Id. at 224.63Id. "We recognize that the language of the statute gives some support to this reading, in
that it uses the formulation, 'causes dilution,' rather than referring to 'likelihood of dilution.' In
our view, however, such a reading depends on excessive literalism to defeat the intent of the
statute." Id. (internal citation omitted).
MId. The court also stated:
"Notwithstanding the use of the present tense in "causes dilution," it seems plausibly
within Congress's meaning to understand the statute as intending to provide for an
injunction to prevent the harm before it occurs... [To do so] would subject the senior user
to uncompensable injury [since the] statute could not be invoked until injury had
occurred... [a]nd, because the statute provides only for an injunction and no damages
(absent willfulness), such injury would never be compensated."
Id. (internal citation omitted).
6 Nabisco, 191 F.3d 208 (1999).
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that the Lanham Act's definition of dilution as the "lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish," represents a likelihood or probability
test built right into the definition of what constitutes dilution in the first place.66 In
addition to that fundamental semantic argument, though, there are several reasons
why the likelihood standard is more desirable than the actual harm standard. Not
only is actual harm more burdensome to prove, but the history of the dilution
statutes on the state level and the legislative purpose behind the Trademark
Amendments Act of 1999 (passed four years after the FTDA) both indicate that
likelihood of dilution is the more appropriate and advantageous standard for the
federal courts to employ.
A. The "Burden" of Proving Actual Harm
Requiring plaintiffs to prove actual harm in order to succeed on a federal
dilution claim has proven to be, and will prove to be, quite difficult.67 As J.
Thomas McCarthy puts it, "[t]he stringent test of actual harm adopted by the
Fourth Circuit [in Ringling Bros.] raises the question of how the owner of a
famous mark could ever muster proof that it was the accused use that was the
cause of a demonstrable, present injury to the selling power of its famous
mark."6" The two suggested methods of proof of actual harm are: (1) proof (by
66See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at 24:90 (emphasis added).67See Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999). The Fourth Circuit was certain, though, that Congress did
not intend to create property rights in gross, even for famous trademarks. Expressing concern
that such protection would be overbroad, the court stated:
[H]owever amorphously they may be expressed, and however difficult to prove in
practice, the Act literally prescribes as elements of its dilution claim both specific harm to
the senior mark's economic value in the form of a "lessening of [its] capacity... to
identify and distinguish goods and services," and a causal connection between that harm
and the "commercial use" of a replicating junior mark. It will not bear a property-right-in-
gross interpretation.
Id. at 459 (intemal citation omitted). The Second Circuit agreed that the "dilution statutes do not
create a 'property right in gross,"' while at the same time disagreeing with the imposition of the
actual harm standard. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224 n.6. Many commentators have the same
worry. See, e.g., Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational
Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. Prrr. L. REv. 790, 851-63 (1997) (arguing that
trademark dilution law unjustifiably grants a property right in gross to the trademark owner to
the detriment of competition). But cf Matthew S. Voss, Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development & Nabisco, Inc. v. P.F. Brands,
Inc., 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 265, 267 (2000) (stating that, despite the problems of an
overbroad interpretation that effectively gives trademark owners property rights in gross, an
overly restrictive reading would tend to provide no remedy at all, thereby defeating the FTDA's
purpose of protecting truly famous and distinctive marks from a loss in distinctiveness).6 8 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at 24:94.1. "Compared to the almost automatic assumption
of dilution that most courts had adopted under the state anti-dilution laws, the Fourth Circuit's
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eliminating other causes) that defendant's use caused plaintiff an "actual loss of
revenues, ' 69 and (2) conducting a "skillfully constructed consumer survey"
designed to demonstrate "consumer impressions from which actual harm and
cause might rationally be inferred."7°
These methods, as the Second Circuit explained in Nabisco, are not simple
answers to the problem. In response to method one (proof of revenue loss), the
Nabisco court stated that "[e]ven if diminished revenue could be shown, it would
be extraordinarily speculative and difficult to prove that the loss was due to the
dilution of the mark."71 Further, the Second Circuit in Nabisco criticized the
decision raised the required burden of proof up to a level that perhaps few owners of famous
marks will be able to successfully achieve." Id.; see also Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 464
(admitting that "[p]roof will be difficult, because actual, consummated dilutive harm and its
cause are difficult concepts").69See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 465. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged, though, that
such proof of actual revenue loss is available "most rarely." Id. A major problem with requiring
plaintiffs to show actual revenue loss, as explained by the Second Circuit, is that if a famous
mark has continually been diluted for an extended period of time, it may be difficult for the
senior user to show diminished revenues because there would be no way in which to measure
what the revenues would be without the junior mark's influence. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223-
24. In addition, any diminished revenues that could be shown would be speculative and it
would be difficult to prove that the loss was due to dilution of the mark in general, let alone by
the junior user's actions. Id. at 224; see also Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The New Wild West:
Measuring and Proving Fame and Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 63
ALB. L. REv. 201, 235 (1999) (criticizing the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the FTDA as
requiring proof of dilution to be shown by actual economic harm to the famous mark's selling
power through use of the junior mark). "The court failed to recognize that dilution of a mark
does not occur ovemight. Dilution is a slow process whereby a multitude of small users can
erode a famous mark's ability to uniquely signify a source." Id.; cf Prager, supra note 3, at 130
(noting that requiring actual harm to be shown is a "higher hurdle than that facing plaintiffs
under state dilution statutes, which permit recovery upon a showing of a 'likelihood of
dilution."'). This author believes that the uncertainty inherent in bringing in "direct" evidence
(i.e. a balance sheet, income statement, historical statement of cash flow, and/or a statement of
surplus), that will prove that any loss in revenue was more likely than not caused by the
defendant's use of the mark, makes this method of proof both rare in effectiveness and
extremely weak in real probative value.
7 See Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 465. The court intimated a third method of proof to
augment the other two. The third possibility... was said to be "contextual factors such as the
extent of the junior user's exposure, the similarity of the marks, the firmness of the senior
mark's hold, [which] are of obvious relevance as indirect evidence that might complement
other proof." Id.
See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224. The court also feared that, assuming a successful
exploitation by the junior user of the senior mark, "the senior user might never be able to show
diminished revenues, no matter how obvious it was that the junior use diluted the
distinctiveness of the senior [use]." Id. at 223-24; see also I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163
F.3d 27, 49 (1st Cir. 1998) (reasoning that a showing of actual harm was not required because
"demand for one product is almost always lessened whenever a competing product achieves a
measurable degree of success" and further noting that dilution through blurring focuses on the
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Fourth Circuit's second method of proving actual harm (consumer surveys) as
being quite expensive, time-consuming, and prone to manipulation.7 2 In addition,
the Fourth Cicuit failed to state decisively what percentage of dilution, as
evidenced by the consumer survey, would be an acceptable threshold of
dilution.73 As a result, the Second Circuit suggested that plaintiffs be able to
demonstrate dilution by "persuasive circumstantial evidence of dilution of the
"identification of a product, and that is not the same thing as a lessening of demand"). But see
Brent G. Seitz, The Actual Harm Requirement and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act:
Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel
Development, 10 J. ART& ENT. L. 113, 155-56 (1999). Seitz remarked that:
[I]n many cases it will be possible to look back at revenues during the time period when
the junior user first appropriated the famous mark. A gradual shift in revenue from the
senior user to the junior during the period in which the junior user first implemented the
mark would indicate that the senior user's mark had been diluted.
Id. Again, this author maintains that such shaky evidence of a showing of a gradual shift in
revenue, even when from the senior user to the junior user, is still not highly probative of actual
dilution caused by the junior user-especially when not used in conjunction with other forms of
evidence. Therefore, loss of revenue alone should not be conclusive evidence of actual
dilution-survey evidence and other testimonial proof should be employed to get the whole
picture to properly gauge the occurrence and level of dilution.72 ...Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224. Despite the inherent flaws that survey evidence may have it is
widely believed that a survey that can clearly demonstrate dilution may be a plaintiff's strongest
and most persuasive evidence. See, e.g., Patrick M. Bible, Comment, Defining and Quantifying
Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show
Actual Dilution, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 295, 314 (1998). In this comment, Bible suggests that the
most important factors relevant to survey evidence of dilution are: properly selecting and
defining the survey universe and sample, ensuring the surveyed consumers are representative of
that population, and asking clear, non-leading questions that are probative of the dilutive harm.
Id. at 319, 336 (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 21.493 (1995)). One
problem recognized by Bible is that courts often struggle to determine what weight to give to
evidence proffered by litigants, especially when litigants try to prove the existence of mental
association. In such a situation, the litigant offers testimonial evidence from consumers, but
there are obvious practical limitations to obtaining a large and relevant community in such a
situation, and that is why survey evidence has the most potential to provide a "more scientific
means" of demonstrating trademark dilution. Id. at 314-15 (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at
32:189).73 Nguyen, supra note 34, at 168 (citing Courtland L. Reichman, State and Federal
Trademark Dilution, II FRANCHISE L.J. III (1998)). Not all the commentators agree on what
the necessary percentage of respondents making a mental association between the famous mark
and the junior mark has to be, and it certainly is not laid out in the FTDA. See Nguyen, supra
note 69, at 237 (stating that survey evidence should meet a minimum threshold of at least 20%
of respondents making a mental association between the marks in order to establish proof of
dilution); Bible, supra note 72, at 335 (indicating that a finding slightly higher than the 15% to
20% requirement for trademark infringement would be appropriate for a typical survey
attempting to establish dilution). But see MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at 24:92 (asserting that a
mark should not be characterized as "famous," and hence protected under the FTDA, unless it
is known to more than 50% of the defendant's potential customers).
2001] 1883
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
distinctiveness of their marks without being obligated to show lost revenue or
engage in an expensive battle of surveys., 74 It thus can be seen that, although on
its face requiring proof of actual dilution may seem logical, once it is actually
time to prove the dilution, the practical difficulties and uncertainties turn dilution
protection into an unfavorable burden to famous trademark owners who may be
suffering injury.
B. The Relationship of State Antidilution Laws and Congress' Unintended
Departure
State anti-dilution statutes have tended to require a "likelihood of dilution"
analysis, based largely in part on language coming directly from the Model State
Trademark Act.7 By 1994, approximately twenty-six states had statutes adopting
this or substantially similar language.76 Unfortunately, the legislative history of
74Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224. "Plaintiffs are ordinarily free to make their case through
circumstantial evidence that will justify an ultimate inference of injury. 'Contextual factors'
have long been used to establish infringement. [There is] no reason why they should not be
used to prove dilution." Id.; see also Avery Dennison Corp. v. Jerry Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868,
874 (9th Cir. 1999) (interpreting the FTDA as providing relief if the plaintiff can establish that
"(1) the mark is famous; (2) the defendant is making commercial use of the mark in commerce;
(3) the defendant's use began after the plaintiff's mark became famous; and (4) the defendant's
use presents a likelihood of dilution of the distinctive value of the mark.") (emphasis added);
Prager, supra note 3, at 131 (indicating that anecdotal evidence could be used to show evidence
of dilution by tamishment). "This evidence would consist of testimony from the plaintiff's
former customers who declare that they no longer purchase from the plaintiff because they
think the quality of its products has declined, when, in fact, it has not, and when the defendant's
tarnishing activities have been under way." Id. at 131-32. Prager went on to admit that "this sort
of evidence will be hard to find in the first instance and hard to attribute exclusively to the
defendant's activities, since many other market factors may influence the former customer's
opinions." Id. at 132. The presence of many other market factors that may influence the former
customer's opinions is precisely why this author believes that the likelihood standard is more
practical than the actual harm standard-if "actual harm" is found, one must wonder if that
harm is really caused by dilution. The harm may just be a consequence of market forces that are
not properly captured by financial and consumer opinion-based evidence, yet this evidence still
may be effective in showing a likelihood that dilution could occur. The foreseeability element
inherent in this analysis should be the focus of anti-dilution laws if a trademark's selling power
and distinctiveness are really to be protected. To argue an opposing view begs the question of
why damage to the mark is allowed to occur merely because proving the actual cause is so
difficult.75 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at 24:80; see also MODEL ST. TRADEMARK ACr, supra note
20, at § 12.
76 MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at 24:80. McCarthy cites the following states as having anti-
dilution statutes: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Washington. Id
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the FTDA is silent on the important point of what the necessary proof must be
(i.e. actual harm or likelihood of dilution),77 but the Act does state that "federal
trademark law presently coexists with state trademark law, and it is to be expected
that a federal dilution statute should similarly coexist with state dilution law." 8
Implicit in this expectation of coexistence is the assumption that the sponsors of
the FTDA intended the federal courts to look to state law to help discern the
boundaries of the federal cause of action. 9
The fact that the FTDA is silent on the present dispute, coupled with the fact
that the Act was intended to coexist with state law, leads the author of this note to
believe that Congress did not intend to make a significant departure from state
law precedent by requiring actual proof of harm.80 As the Second Circuit in
Nabisco aptly put it, "[n]otwithstanding the use of the present tense in 'causes
dilution [in the FTDA],' it seems plausibly within Congress' meaning to
understand the statute as intending to provide for an injunction to prevent the
harm before it occurs."" By requiring a plaintiff to wait until injury occurs, as the
"See Prager, supra note 3, at 130 (stating that the FTDA is "silent on this seemingly
important point"); see also Horwitz & Prager, supra note 18, at S7 (finding the legislative
history to be silent on this point, but pointing out the necessary coexistence of the federal statute
with state trademark laws); Nguyen, supra note 34, at 165 (noticing that there is a question
concerning what type of proof is required to show actual dilution, if that is indeed the standard
imposed by the FTDA).78H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031; see
also Horwitz & Prager, supra note 18, at S 16. This author seriously doubts how the FTDA can
"coexist" with state dilution law when the standards of proof are so divergent.79 See Litowitz & Rettew, supra note 7, at 36; see also Prager, supra note 3, at 127 (stating
that "[i]t is reasonable to anticipate that past analysis of liability under state dilution statutes will
play a role in future analysis under the federal statute, and there are some thoughtful decisions
construing state dilution statutes prior to the enactment of the FTDA."). But see Seitz, supra
note 71, at 157 (rebuking the notion that courts should engage in the practice of using state
dilution statutes and their interpretations to help decide cases based on the FTDA). This author
argues that the evolution of dilution necessarily calls for the history of state dilution to be
consulted when deciding cases on the federal level, especially given the relative youth of the
FTDA and its purported ambiguousness.8 0But cf Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
170 F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999). "Finally and most telling, there is the fact that in the face of
the obvious centrality of 'likelihood of dilution' provisions in the interpretation and application
of state antidilution statutes for the fifty years of their existence, the federal act does not so
provide." Id. The Fourth Circuit used the difference as support for an intended departure from
likelihood of dilution analysis, whereas this author uses the departure as evidence of an
unintended change on Congress' part. After all, if Congress could have foreseen that such a
dispute would arise, they most likely would have attempted to draft a clearer statute, either in
direct accord or discord with the state statutes' traditional "likelihood of dilution" analysis.
8
'See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999). Some
commentators also claim that the FTDA provides protection against the likelihood that a junior
mark will dilute not only a famous mark's current capacity to identify its source, but also the
famous mark's future capacity to identify its source. See MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at 24:90
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Fourth Circuit suggests in Ringling Bros., the senior user is subjected to
uncompensable injury because the FTDA provides only for an injunction and no
damages (absent willfulness).,2
The actual harm requirement sterilizes the dilution cause of action. Plaintiffs
would have to calculate lost revenue, show it was caused by the defendant's use
of the mark, conduct consumer surveys, and institute court proceedings, all in the
hopes of having a court decide that their mark indeed was diluted. 3 After
"winning" an injunction preventing the defendant from using the mark in such a
dilutive fashion, the plaintiff has to deal with the reality that they spent a
significant amount of money to obtain an "unrewarding" remedy. 4 Such a result
(stating that the FTDA does not require proof of lessening of the strength of the famous mark:
only that there is a lessening of the capacity or the ability of the mark to be strong as a
commercial symbol and identifier); Seitz, supra note 71, at 154 (citing Reichman, supra note
73, at 132, for the proposition that the FTDA appears to require a showing of actual dilution,
but supporting the less stringent requirement that a plaintiff only needs to demonstrate a
likelihood of dilution because the likelihood "interpretation squares with the definition's use of
the word 'capacity,' which indicates that it is the junior user's ability to dilute that is actionable,
not actual dilution in the marketplace."). But see Seitz, supra note 71, at 154 (declaring that
such an interpretation of the word "capacity" in the FTDA's definition of blurring excessively
reads into the plain meaning of the statute). Seitz claims that interpreting capacity to protect a
famous mark's future capacity to identify its source is unfounded because that interpretation not
only gives a new meaning to the language of the statute as a whole, but it also gives a new and
unintended meaning to the word "capacity" as used in the statute since the statute does not
attach any temporal modifiers to the word that could possibly make it read "future capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods and services." Id. Seitz concludes that the lack of
any temporal modifier suggests that Congress intended to denote a "present capacity," which
coincides with the FTDA's plain reading providing a remedy against junior marks that "cause
dilution" as opposed to junior marks that "could cause" or "may cause" dilution. Id. at 155.
2See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224. Such injury would therefore, in most cases, never be
compensated. Id.
3Cf Nguyen, supra note 34, at 167 (arguing that "waiting for enough evidence to be
quantifiable may cause the owner of the famous mark to foreclose his opportunity to get
preliminary injunctive relief from the defendant"). Nguyen further argues that requiring
plaintiffs to show actual economic harm, given the slow process that dilution undertakes, is
unreasonable because not only would it be too late for the senior user to get a preliminary
injunction, but even worse, the junior user may use laches and the existence of numerous third
party uses as a defense to the dilution claim. Id. at 189. Therefore, Nguyen concludes that a
likelihood of dilution standard would be a more realistic test for the plaintiff to demonstrate. Id.
84See Hall v. Holstrom, 289 P. 668, 673 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1930). The court stated that:
The object of injunctive relief is to prevent injury, threatened and probable to result, unless
interrupted. Why should a person be required to stand by and see his property impaired,
before he may stay the hand of the person seeking to offend? Actual injury may be the best
evidence of its own existence, but a person should not be compelled to abide the results of
trespass for the purpose of obtaining evidence of its injurious effects. Wrongs which are
the probable result of given means should be prevented, not awaited.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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seems antithetical to the supposed purpose of the FTDA to "protect famous
trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or
tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion.""5
Not only is an actual harm reading of the FTDA impracticable and harmful to
the plaintiff in terms of the transaction costs of pursuing dilution litigation, but
such a reading of the FTDA is harmful to both the senior and junior users.8 6 The
senior user is harmed because the statute can only be invoked after an injury has
occurred and only provides injunctive relief, not damages.8 7 The junior user is
disadvantaged as well, because an actual harm interpretation of the FTDA
prevents them from knowing whether they will be prohibited from using their
new mark until after it actually establishes the mark in the marketplace, which
will likely be a huge expense in terms of time, effort, and money.8 It can
plausibly be argued, then, that Congress did not intend the FTDA to require actual
"See 141 CONG. REC. H14,317-01 (Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead); cf
MCCARTHY, supra note 6, at 24:94.1 (stating that, in comparison to the "almost automatic
assumption of dilution that most courts had adopted under the state anti-dilution laws, the
Fourth Circuit's decision [in Ringling Bros.] raised the required burden of proof up to a level
that perhaps few owners of famous marks will be able to successfully achieve").86 See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224.
87Id. The FTDA only provides damages in actions where willfulness can be proven. See
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2) (Supp. V 1998) (stating that injunctive relief shall be granted "unless the
person against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's
reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark"). If such willful intent on the part of the
defendant is shown, plaintiffs can receive damages including attomey's fees and treble
damages. See id
"See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 224. The court stated that:
If the statute is interpreted to mean that no adjudication can be made until the junior mark
has been launched and has caused actual dilution, businesses in [the position of the junior
user] will be unable to seek declaratory relief [that their mark is non-dilutive] before going
to market. They will be obligated to spend the huge sums involved in a product launch
without the ability to seek prior judicial assurance that their mark will not be enjoined
[later by the senior user].
Id. But see Seitz, supra note 71, at 156 (proposing that the actual harm requirement, in terms of
declaratory actions, will help junior users in many cases because if the likelihood standard was
adopted, many marks would be enjoined that may not actually dilute the senior's mark once
allowed to be used in the marketplace). "The actual dilution standard allows the junior user to
place the mark in commerce so that a determination can be made as to whether it actually
dilutes a famous mark. The likelihood standard would deprive the junior user of such an
opportunity." Id. Seitz also concludes that the actual harm standard is appropriate because if a
junior user is "truly nervous" about the development of its mark because it may dilute a famous
mark already in existence, then the "prudent decision would be to change its mark so as to
avoid such a conflict." Id. This author's response is that that situation is exactly why the
likelihood standard is the most logical and engrained standard for dilution-the practical
business decision of forecasting whether there might be potential for dilution is, in essence, the
definition of likelihood of dilution in action.
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harm, and that their "clear" wording of that standard was a legislative oversight
that needed to be (and has been partially) remedied. 9
C. The Trademark Amendments Act of 1999
Perhaps the most telling evidence in favor of a likelihood of dilution analysis
as opposed to an actual harm requirement for dilution claims is found in the
legislative history behind the Trademark Amendments Act of 1999.90 The
purpose of the TAA, as stated by the sponsor of the Act, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-
UT), is to, inter alia, "provide stronger and more efficient protection for
trademark owners and consumers by making it possible to prevent trademark
dilution before it occurs.... ,,91 The TAA authorizes the Trademark Trial and
Appeals Board (TTAB) to consider dilution as grounds for refusal to register a
mark or for cancellation of a registered mark.92 This provision was implemented
"See infra Part V.C.
90 Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-43, 113 Stat. 218.
91 145 CONG. REC. S7452-53 (daily ed. June 22, 1999) (emphasis added) (statement of
Sen. Hatch). The Trademark Amendments Act (TAA) was designed to amend the Trademark
Act of 1946 relating to dilution of famous marks, but the legislative history indicates that the
TAA was created to improve some of the areas of protection afforded by the FIDA. See also
Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, supra note 88. It is also compelling that the sponsor of
the TAA himself, Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, was also the sponsor of the Senate's version of
the FTDA in 1995. See 141 CONG. REC. S38,559 (Dec. 29, 1995). Given that Senator Hatch
knew the background of the law concerning trademark dilution and the need for a federal
statute, it should be highly persuasive evidence that he, speaking for the Senate and perhaps for
Congress as a whole, recognized the flaws of the FTDA and introduced the TAA as a remedy.
Most telling is the clear purpose of the TAA, as stated by Senator Hatch, to provide protection
to trademark owners to stave off dilution before it occurs. This forward-looking, pro-active
approach to dilution embodies the likelihood standard. The actual harm standard, then, although
the most accurate textual reading of the FTDA, does not properly reflect the congressional
intent of the sponsor of the bill himself, and therefore the TAA and its legislative history,
although not explicitly amending the FTDA, should provide enough evidence to the federal
courts that Congress' intention was and is to establish the likelihood standard and not the actual
harm standard for trademark dilution on the federal level.
92 145 CONG. REC. S7452-54; see also Babson Bros. Co. v. Surge Power Corp., 39
U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1953 (T.T.A.B. 1996). Under the FTDA, the TTAB was not authorized to
hear an opposition or cancellation proceeding; instead, the federal district courts had the onus of
hearing dilution claims and were armed with injunctive and cancellation relief. Now, under the
TAA, the issue of dilution can be addressed in an opposition or cancellation proceeding in front
of the ITAB. This costs considerably less than a federal court proceeding, and any increase in
workload for the TTAB is significantly offset by the reduction in workload of the federal courts
as well as the sizeable savings in court costs that were previously imposed upon owners of
famous marks due to the "torturous route.., available today [prior to the enactment of the
TAA]...." See Prepared Statement of Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director, American
Intellectual Property Law Association, Before the House Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property (May 5, 1999), in FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE,
LEXIS, Nexis, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE File.
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to remedy the interpretation of the FTDA that required trademark owners to wait
to seek relief under the FTDA until dilution of the mark had occurred (a.k.a. the
actual harm requirement).93 Senator Hatch complained that, due to the actual
harm requirement, the "owner of a famous mark must stand idly by throughout
the registration process and await recourse through costly litigation in federal
court only after he has suffered harm to his mark. '94 Although the TAA was not
explicitly designed to change or amend the disputed section of the FTDA, the
purpose behind the amendments arguably indicates that Congress does not now
intend to require plaintiffs to show actual harm in a federal dilution claim.
Practical reasoning therefore leads to the conclusion that a likelihood of dilution
requirement is the logical method of proof for dilution claims on the federal
level. 95
93 145 CONG. REC. S7452-54. The Fourth Circuit's implementation of the actual harm
requirement for dilution "significantly increased the desirability of allowing owners of famous
marks to oppose and petition to cancel the registration of diluting marks." Kirk, supra note 92,
at 2. Allowing for opposition or cancellation proceedings based on dilution "permit[s] the
applicant or owner of a diluting mark to seek an alternative mark for his or her goods or
services at an earlier stage, thereby avoiding wasteful advertising and promotional
expenditures." Id.; see also Prepared Statement of Mr. Kim Muller, Vice President Trademark
Affairs and Policies, International Trademark Association, Before the House Committee on the
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property (May 5, 1999), in FEDERAL NEWS
SERVICE, LEXIS, Nexis, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE File (purporting that the current state of the
law [under the FTDA] is inefficient and creates uncertainty in the process of adopting and
registering a mark). Mr. Muller stated that:
Allowing owners of famous marks to oppose a trademark application or to seek
cancellation of a trademark registration within the first five years based on dilution of their
mark will best protect the rights and interests of all parties involved in such disputes, will
facilitate administration of the trademark register, and is consistent with international
trademark policy. Trademark law will be more efficient if owners of famous trademarks
have the ability to intercede earlier in the process to resolve these important issues rather
than to permit the registration of a diluting mark which can only be remedied by protracted
and expensive federal litigation.
Id.
94145 CONG. REc. S7452-54. "By specifically allowing the trademark owner to oppose
registration or to petition for cancellation of a diluting mark, [the TAA] will prevent needless
harm to the goodwill and distinctiveness of many trademarks and will make enforcing the
federal dilution statute less costly and time consuming for all involved." Id.; cf Kirk, supra note
90, at 3 (noting that a finding of dilution by the TTAB might well cause the applicant to select a
different mark prior to investment of substantial funds and certainly would give fair notice of
the risks involved in going forward; therefore, allowing oppositions based on dilution is in the
interest of both the applicant and the opposer). For further discussion of the detrimental effects
of the actual harm standard to both the junior and senior user, see supra Part V.B.
9"See Eli Lilly and Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 834, 852 (S.D. Ind. 2000). In
Eli Lilly and Co., the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted
the plaintiff a preliminary injunction against defendant's use of the mark HERBROZAC for
part of a line of products designed to promote Mood Elevation, and as a "powerful and effective
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VI. CONCLUSION
Ever since the concept of trademark dilution began in 1927, scholars have
struggled with its relation to traditional trademark infiingement. Dilution by
definition is a more nebulous concept, bringing inherent uncertainties to methods
of proof. The need for a congressional amendment to clarify the language of the
FTDA in terms of what a plaintiff must prove for dilution, though, has been
partially obviated by the passage of the TAA. The legislative history behind the
TAA, indicating a congressional desire to clear up a fundamental aspect in the
dispute over what the standard of proof should be in dilution actions, has brought
a level of closure to a previously unclear situation-plaintiffs should only have to
prove a likelihood of dilution in order to succeed on a dilution claim under the
federal statute. This is how the states have had it for decades, and this is how it
should be on the national level as well.96 Perhaps Congress should directly amend
the FTDA to further clarify its intent, but for the moment, the TAA's provision
allowing for an opposition or cancellation proceeding to be instituted based on
dilution should be evidence enough of the congressional desire to prevent dilution
before it occurs, thus calling for a likelihood of dilution standard also to be
employed by the federal courts.
all-natural and herbal formula alternative to the prescription drug Prozac." Id. at 835. The court
found that defendant's mark HERBROZAC was likely to cause dilution by blurring of
plaintiff's famous and incontestable mark PROZAC-a prescription drug used to treat clinical
depression and some other psychological conditions. Id. In heralding the likelihood of dilution
interpretation of the FTDA, the court stated the following:
If the holder of a senior mark cannot obtain injunctive relief until after actual dilution has
occurred, the holder of the senior mark must suffer significant and irreparable harm before
it is entitled to relief. [In many cases], the senior mark holder would probably not be able
to establish proof of actual dilution when the first junior mark has just come on the
scene .... By the time a number of junior marks have come into use, the senior mark
holder would have a better chance of establishing actual dilution, but if the senior mark
holder waits to file any dilution claims until after it can show actual irreparable harm from
dilution, the senior mark holder would be open to the argument that it has not actively
protected its mark. In addition, in determining whether the senior mark is famous and
distinctive, the junior mark holder will have evidence of all the other junior marks to
dispute the senior mark's distinctiveness. With every new junior mark, actual dilution
increases and the fame and distinctiveness of the senior mark decreases. This sort of
double-edged sword is contrary to the purpose behind the Dilution Act. Its purpose was to
give the senior mark holder the ability to protect its mark with injunctive relief when the
first junior mark arises and before any substantial harm is done.
Id. at 853. The court's practical concerns in Eli Lilly and Co. (as stated above) are persuasive
evidence, in this author's opinion, that a "likelihood of dilution" interpretation is the only
coherent standard of proof for federal trademark dilution claims.
96 A potential problem if a national standard is not adopted could be forum shopping by
trademark owners in order to avoid courts in the Fourth and Fifth Circuit so that they do not
have to prove actual harm to get relief. See Nguyen, supra note 34, at 169.
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